Vagueness is a manifestation of some kind of indeterminacy: it is also a pervasive feature of language and, possibly, of reality and thought. Even though the contemporary philosophical debate on vagueness has reached a high degree of development, the haziness of the notion and the intricacies at issue can lead some to raise a rather disarming doubt: is everyone actually talking about the same thing? The essays collected in this book – from the “logic of clear cases” to the Wright-Rosenkranz debate on the tenability of an agnostic theory of vagueness – show the varieties of attitudes and approaches that one is naturally led to expect when the topic at issue is that of vagueness. All contributions to this volume will be relevant to anyone interested in vagueness at an advanced level and may be helpful also to the novice – eager to form an impression of the main problems at present under discussion.
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